At the recent Sixteenth International Symposium on Economic Crime, Jonathan Winer analysed the background to recent worldwide financial services collapses. The text of Mr Winer's presentation is reproduced here.
I n recent weeks, we have had a major crash in the middle of the financial services electronic highway, and hundreds of millions of people are already feeling the shock trom the impact, even if they were nowhere near the site of the impact in Moscow.
The current Russian crisis simultaneously poses threats to the world's capital markets, Eurasian political stability and democracy in the Newly Independent States, in addition to the viability of the market reforms the International Monetary Fund has been seeking to put in place all over the earth. It provides a perfect case history of the relevance of the theme of this
conference, The Prevention and Control oj Economic Crime Against
Governments, to both national and international security'.
CAUSES OF THE RUSSIAN CRISIS
There have been many analyses of the causes of the recent Russia crisis. Its relationship to the problem of economic crime provides a window into vulnerabilities in our system of financial supervision, regulation, and enforcement that are literally global.
For years, analysts have suggested that the viability of Russian reform was threatened by Russia's lack of transparency, inadequate regulation, inadequate law enforcement, corruption and organized crime. They noted that financial crime threatened the integrity of Russia's financial systems and simultaneously fuelled many other types of criminal activity, discouraged foreign investment, facilitated capital flight, and robbed Russia of the resources it needed to move forward with privatization and modernization.
But despite the profound flaws of its political, juridical and financial systems, Russia is not itself the problem. Russia is not unique; it is not even that unusual. The recent global raging bear market is merely the freshest reminder that global capital flows and global technologies have out-paced the ability of governments to regulate or to enforce the rules necessary for efficient markets. Instead, in country after country, we see financial discontinuities, anomalies, inadequate regulation, and fraud, leaving the world subject instead to sudden, wild gyrations in financial markets.
Mexico has had many of the same problems in its political and financial systems as Russia has had, with as much corruption in evidence as transparency and regulatory integrity has been missing. Mexico, like Russia, was a miracle of the marketplace, until in early 1995, the miracle proved mirage and the bailouts began. Japan's financial system singularly has little transparency, poor auditing, weak regulatory controls, and the shared participation of its banks and its local form of organized crime, the Yakuza, in real estate speculation. For much of the 1990s, Japan has been in a slow free-fall, which continues to this day. Last year, what was then called the Asian Financial Flu spread through Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand. Each of these financial sector collapses, like the most recent Russian problem, took place in environments that featured poor regulation, weak law enforcement, little financial transparency, a fair degree of official corruption, and no laws against laundering money.
Eesser known financial collapses have had similar features.
For example, the collapse in 1995 of Latvia's largest commercial bank occurred because the bank had been controlled by a criminal group, that used the bank to make bad loans to its front companies and defrauded the bank's accounts of as much as $40m. That collapse provoked a major financial crisis in Latvia, contributed to a change in the government, and forced Latvia to seek short-term assistance from the International Monetary Fund (see President's International Crime Control Strategy, The White House, May 1998, p. 18) . Similarly, a series of pyramid or 'Ponzi' schemes in Albania last year stripped the country of more than $2 50m in capital, causing the government to collapse, as hundreds of thousands of impoverished refugees fled to Italy.
The flaws in our current system of governance in the area of international financial service activities should not surprise us.
As technology globalized financial markets beyond national borders, governments, regulators and law enforcement agencies stayed at home, their responsibilities most often limited to overseeing domestic activities of entities and markets. While anyone with a computer, modem and bank account had the ability to move funds throughout every jurisdiction in the world, no government regulator or law enforcement agency was simultaneously granted the ability to trace funds through any jurisdiction but its own.
We created a financial services electronic highway without enforceable speed limits and without highway patrols. The recent Russian crack-up has thrown debris all over that highway, causing all kinds of collateral damage to everyone else relying on the same infrastructure to move around, before the repair crews had completed their work on Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Japan. As we clean up from this latest major accident, we need to think about what kind of rules we can put in place now to reduce the risk of additional accidents happening while we are still undertaking repairs. We need also to be working on longerterm changes to impose enough regulation and enforcement within the global financial services system to ensure a reasonable level of protection for all its billions of individual and corporate users, regardless of where they are located. 
SMOKE SIGNALS

BANKERS OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC
Cook Islands
Recently, the Department of State reviewed a group of offshore entities based in the Cook Islands, a group of 1 5 coral islands in the heart of the South Pacific, spread over an area the size of India, with a population of just 18,000 souls and 3,000 separate, registered, anonymous off-shore trusts. The review revealed connections between this village-sized 'nation-state', organized crime, Russia, and the some of the most notorious financial players in the Asia Pacific region.
The first names among the Cook Islands' bankers to leap out to an American reviewer were those belonging to a well-known 
Samoa
In Samoa, the newly created offshore industry features only 15 offshore banks. This small sector, however, already includes among its bankers a Russian who travels on Honduran and
Russian passports, and who has some 300 offshore companies also registered in Samoa. Its other bankers include a Greek and a Russian arrested in Malta for operating an unlicensed bank, misappropriation of funds and forgery, a Swiss banker known unfavorably to Swiss authorities, a Ukrainian-Israeli, a Lebanese based in Beirut, another gentleman with a Swiss criminal record, some people whose addresses in the US turned out to be false, and a Russian individual who is currently in the custody of European law enforcement.
As this summary suggests, the offshore bankers of the South Pacific include a fair number of criminals, operating in these tiny jurisdictions precisely because they are tiny, under-regulated, and protected from international law enforcement. Years ago, the location of these islands would have made them extremely undesirable sites for international finance, because the lack of infrastructure would have made financial dealings through them fact that it had a $5 billion hole in its books that left it with no working capital. As regulators and law enforcement officials ultimately proved, BCCI did so by hiding the losses in subsidiaries in the Caymans and the Dutch Antilles. Ten years later, when Daiwa bank suffered massive losses in its commodities trading operations, it too turned to the offshore world to hide its losses, a scheme that was only discovered not by effective bank regulation, but because one of the insiders became an informant for prosecutors. The Venezuelan banking crisis of the mid-1990s went through the same process of seeing massive capital losses from insider lending being hidden through offshore operations in the nearby Antilles. Japan's crisis has had similar patterns: bad loans, fraud and an account manipulation overseas to keep the day of reckoning at bay. The current financial crisis in Russia is thus best viewed as merely the latest wave in a cascade that requires systematic changes in how we all do business. The international financial markets move money through countries that have excellent record-keeping, regulatory, and auditing practices, and through countries that have essentially none, treating all the electronic digits as if they are the same, regardless of the route they take on the way to where they are reinvested. This breathtaking egalitarianism has, in a number of cases, masked underlying financial realities, so that money has appeared to exist when in fact the underlying capital was no longer available. The amazing global infrastructure for moving money has been tripped up because the infrastructure cannot see whether these electronic digits adequately represent reality in the world outside.
For us to continue to feel safety and reliability in the electronic digits that now represent the world's wealth, we need to strengthen our systems of regulation and enforcement. business, or to a nation's entire economy.
The answers to these questions are of interest not only to the South Pacific, Caribbean and Mediterranean financial havens, but to every government and to every major financial services sector in the world.
MOUNTING LOSSES
These issues began to be raised in the mid-1980s, when the Beyond these standard elements for next steps, are some possible innovations that would exceed current international practice, to provide greater reach for law enforcement and less impunity for financial criminals. These steps include the following.
Asserting universal jurisdiction over and access to records
No nation can protect its citizens if they do business with someone whose activities, records, property, and person remain beyond the government's reach. The US has long asserted very broad jurisdiction over the documents it needs from financial services providers when it comes to criminal prosecutions, through a doctrine that is sometimes known as the 'Bank of Nova Scotia' doctrine, for the money-laundering case where it first arose. Mutual legal assistance treaties are a major new mechanism by which countries may co-operate with one another in retrieving essential evidence of financial crimes. The UN 
Refusing to accept bank secrecy in cases involving financial crime
Nations cannot protect their citizens from financial crime if financial criminals are able to shield their criminal conduct through the use of bank secrecy. Jurisdictions that do not permit law enforcement to gain access to financial records in cases involving allegations of criminal conduct turn themselves into safe havens for financial criminals. Just as the EU has sued its member, Austria, to stop its issuance of anonymous banking accounts, the Financial Action Task Force and other international bodies need to consider taking appropriate measures to sanction countries that have become safe havens for financial criminals. Such sanctions need not be anything that would impair the ability of financial markets to function normally. When the Seychelles developed a package of economiccitizenship that purported to include protecting criminal proceeds from international law enforcement, the Financial Action Task Force asked all its members to treat transactions with the Seychelles as 'suspicious transactions', requiring immediate referral to law enforcement. Such an approach could develop into a two-tier system for international banking transactions: the top tier, including countries that meet the FATE recommendations, would have their transactions treated normally. Countries not permitting overseas regulators or law enforcement to have access to financial records would have their transactions subjected to additional regulatory controls. The most egregious would be subject to an automatic presumption that the transaction is suspicious, to be stored and analyzed by national FIUs. This type of two-tier system would reflect the actual risks to the global financial system inherent in having portions of that system act as black holes out of which information may not be recovered.
Eliminating differential treatment of offshore transactions
The offshore concept is based on a notion that what is necessary to regulate transactions involving the citizens of one's own country is not necessary in handling transactions involving the citizens of other nations. Its impact has been to encourage some financial institutions deliberately to structure themselves so that they are not regulated by anyone. Recently one such institution, Caymanx Bank, structured itself so that its operations in the Isle of Man were offshore to the Isle of Man, because it was a subsidiary of an institution in the Caymans. It was also offshore to the Caymans, because it was only doing business in the Isle of Man. As a result, its activities were effectively free of regulation, and its clients' records were advertised on the Internet as being free of oversight by the (1) adding tax evasion to the list of predicate offenses for money-laundering in their own anti-money-laundering laws;
(2) including tax evasion among the grounds for the elimination of bank secrecy in the provision of documents to law enforcement: and (3) amending mutual legal assistance agreements to include tax offenses.
If such an approach became generally accepted, nations that continued to make themselves available for tax evasion aimed at other countries might well find that the potential damage to their reputation from remaining outside this new system outweighed the potential income from continuing to offer these Co-operating in repatriation of assets and broadening civil remedies Too often, victims of financial crime find themselves unable to reach the assets of those who have victimized them.
Governments need to look at mechanisms to permit early immobilization of assets of financial criminals and mutual assistance in ensuring that the immobilization is international, not merely domestic.
Governments should consider assigning agents from several law enforcement agencies to work together in a task force 
OUT OF REACH
No nation can protect its citi/.ens if they do business with someone whose activities, records, property and person remain beyond the government's reach. 
GETTING THERE
Having a carefully developed recipe provides guidance to the cook, but the proof of the pudding is in the eating. The proposals articulated here represent the ingredients of a policy that will be fed to hungry policymakers in the coming months The negotiation within the next two years of an effective UN convention against trans-national organized crime that will provide our law enforcement authorities with the additional tools they need.
Implementing rapidly ten principles and a ten-point action plan agreed by our ministers on high tech crime, including the creation of a 24-hour-a-day team of experts in each country to assist one another in cases involving high tech crime, seven Agreement on principles and the need for adequate legislation to facilitate asset confiscation from convicted criminals, including ways to help each other trace, freeze and confiscate those assets and, where possible, in accordance with national legislation, share seized assets with other nations.
Many of the next steps will be in the hands of the private sector. To protect themselves, private firms will necessarily have to intensify due diligence, internal compliance, and risk assessment efforts. Without such steps, major institutions will find themselves recurrently forced to take major losses of the kind that some international banks experienced this past August in Russia. During the months to come, such efforts will prove important in reducing the risk of one's institution becoming liable to others victimized by lack of transparency or by financial crime. It is far harder to be held civilly liable in civil litigation when one has adopted and implemented all relevant best practices. If one has not done so, the potential risk to suit by plaintiffs' lawyers can be profound. By contrast, having adopted best practices, a firm is in the position to more or less define whether its competitors have put in sufficient controls themselves.
Through this mechanism, an entire industry's practices can transform themselves quickly. We saw this in the US during the 1980s. A few prosecutions of and civil suits against banks, their corporate officers, members of their boards of directors, and their outside auditors, asserting their liability for financial losses associated with the Savings and Loan Industry had an immediate prophylactic impact, intensifying their efforts to ensure they had practices in place to discourage fraud. The US has repeatedly found that criminal and civil action against private sector wrongdoers is a remarkably effective mechanism to transform industry wide standards of compliance. One obvious next candidate in the US for this mechanism, following the now notorious case of Carlos Salinas' use of Citibank in Mexico, would be the targeting of the private banking services offered by major international banks. On this, perhaps we will see more soon.
As we undertake these steps and others, we will not become 'crash-proof, nor will we wipe out financial crime. We will have hardened our target to the attacks of the unscrupulous, made it harder for criminals and terrorists to get away with financial crimes when they occur, facilitated our ability to trace their assets and bring them to justice. If we are able to take the principles of 'know your customer' and transparency seriously, and make them universal principles that are universally implemented, we may even succeed in reducing the threat of instability to the worlds financial markets. Ĵ
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